This paper examines the impact of political competition on economic growth. Using results from the 1994 and 1999 elections I show that municipalities with a decisive vote either for or against the dominant national party have grown faster than municipalities with more voter competition amongst various political parties. I show that in democracies, governments with more freedom to make decisions and less threat from opposition political parties are associated with faster economic growth and improvement in supply of some public goods.
Introduction
Many authors have attempted to study the relationship between political systems and economic growth. The studies usually examine varying degrees of democracy and autocracy and the effect of the political system on subsequent growth. Although there is no consensus, 1 the literature seems to suggest that very high economic growth rates are associated with autocracies. Sachs (2005) and Collier (2009) for instance argue that democracy is not helpful for economic development. Kelsall and Booth (2013) and Booth (2012) also argue that multi party electoral democracies are more likely to experience slower growth through weaker governance. Jones and Olken (2005) argue that democracies make it difficult for successful economic policies, such as those of Lee-Kwan Yew in Singapore or Deng Xiaoping in China, to be implemented. Although some studies argue for a positive effect of democracy on economic growth, the argument in favor of more autocratic regimes seems to center around strong political leadership. La Porta, Lopez de Silanez, and Shleifer (2004) for example argue that many of the countries that managed to get out of poverty since 1960 were autocratic regimes. They argue that the choices made by dictators have allowed some poor countries emerge from poverty. In essence these studies argue that the freedom of autocratic leaders to make tough choices, if they choose to, gives autocratic regimes an advantage. However the freedom to make tough decisions and the political system are not necessarily intertwined. It is possible to have relatively weak autocratic regimes which do not have the freedom to make long term decisions. On the other hand it is also possible to have strong political regimes in democracies that have the relative freedom to make tough decisions without the threat of being voted out.
In this paper I examine the effect of the freedom to make decisions without obstruction from political actors, here on referred to as political competition, on economic growth in a democracy. Using election results from municipalities across South Africa, I estimate the relationship between political competition and economic growth. I make the assumption that municipalities with more evenly distributed votes between the dominant political party and opposition parties face more restrictions on decision making. Examining the effect of political competition across municipalities in South Africa allows me to isolate some of the effects of having different types of political institutions. Municipalities across South Africa are all democratic and all face the same systems of checks and balances, the threat of unconstitutional regime changes are virtually nonexistent, there is a reasonable amount of individual and press freedoms that apply across municipalities, and the rules regarding accountability are relatively uniform across all municipalities. I find that in municipalities in South Africa, a higher level of political competition is associated with slower growth. I use election results in previous elections as instruments to show that this result is at least partly causal. Finally I show that higher levels of political competition are associated with slower improvement in the provision of public goods across South Africa.
Background
Although there is no consensus on the impacts of democracy and autocracy on economic growth, episodes of high growth in some countries are often associated with autocratic regimes. Deng Xiaoping in China, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and Paul Kagame in Rwanda are often touted as examples of cases where autocratic regimes have a successfully implemented growth miracles. Olson (2000) for example argues that autocratic regimes can produce faster economic growth given some conditions, such as the expectation of a long tenure. Almeida and Ferreira (2002) test some of the arguments of Olson (2000) and find that the best performers are more likely to be autocracies. Although they show that the worst are likely to be autocracies as well. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) also find that poor countries that get out of poverty tend to be led by dictators. Findings by Acemoglu (2003) and Yang (2008) also support the argument that countries with periods of high growth rates are often associated with autocracies. The argument in favor of these autocratic regimes is that leaders have more discretionary power to implement either good or bad policies. This discretionary power is however limited in democracies where leaders are accountable to the electorate and face the constant threat of removal. According to Jones and Olken (2005) , "Democracies may be able to prevent the disastrous economic policies of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Samora Machel in Mozambique; however, they might also have constrained the successful economic policies of Lee-Kwan Yew in Singapore or Deng Xiaoping in China".
However the discretionary power to make decisions is not necessarily fixed given the type of political system. The same political dynamics might also occur internally in democracies.
Democracies where leaders, for whatever reason have guaranteed votes, have more discretion to implement policies which may be unpopular but ultimately good for growth. On the other hand in areas where votes are more evenly distributed among political parties, the threat of losing power serves as a deterrent to implementing unpopular growth enhancing policies. The level of political competition within democracies can perhaps be seen as proxy for the freedom to make tough choices without electoral consequences. In the context of a democratic society, regions with strong victories for a specific party are in some sense freer to make tough policy decisions. Regions dominated by a single party may also face less obstructions from opposition parties, obstructions which may hinder the policy making process and the provision of public goods. These obstructions, and the threat of obstruction, may ultimately lead to faster growth in regions with strong victories for single political parties compared with regions where multiple parties win significant votes. The same strong support for specific political parties can also have negative effects. As is the case with autocratic regimes, governments with discretionary powers can also pursue growth destroying policies.
Some research has been done on political competition in different countries. Pinto and Timmons (2005) find that across countries political competition decreases the rate of physical capital accumulation and labor mobilization but increases the rate of human capital accumulation. They find that political competition systematically affects growth although the effects are both positive and negative. Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) find that in the United States, lack of political competition in states is associated with anti-growth policies such as higher taxes and lower capital spending. They argue for a link between low levels of political competition and slow growth. Ricciuti (2003) , Goeminne, Geys, and Smolders (2007) and Volkerink and de Haan (2000) all find that some measures of political fragmen-tation, which can be thought of as potential political competition, are associated with larger government deficits and debt.
In this paper I examine the relationship between political competition and economic growth across municipalities in South Africa. South Africa provides a good case study for understanding the effects of this type of competition on economic growth. South Africa is a stable democracy with reasonably free and fair elections held every five years since the end of apartheid. Some of the much highlighted disadvantages of autocratic regimes, such as coups, lack of individual freedoms and so on are somewhat mitigated in South Africa.
The political system and mode of public administration also allows South Africa to serve as a test case. Public administration in South Africa is broken up into different levels of government with provincial governments divided up into district municipalities. District municipalities are then divided into metropolitan and local municipalities. The governments of metropolitan and local municipalities are elected by a system of mixed member proportional representation. In this system the overall total of party members mirrors the proportion of votes received during elections. This system guarantees that political parties that win a significant share of the vote, but not a majority of the vote, still participate in government.
In the context of political competition, the higher the fraction of the total vote won by the majority party, the more independent control that party has. However opposition parties can still influence policy with their influence depending on the fraction of votes they win during elections. In essence, depending on election results, there is a lot of variation across municipalities on the level of political competition. The political system is however identical for all municipalities, and the democratic nature also allows me to isolate some of the major negative effects of more autocratic political systems. To understand why the fraction of voters who chose the ANC signifies political competition it is perhaps useful to consider scenarios at both ends of the voting spectrum. If all the voters chose the ANC then the municipality is considered a guaranteed ANC district.
The likelihood of the ANC losing the district is relatively small regardless of what the ANC does. The ANC also faces less threat of obstruction on its local policies from opposition parties. The potential benefits to opposition parties from actively fighting the ANC are relatively small as a large vote for the ANC implies it is in complete control of the political machinery in that municipality. The cost to opposition parties of trying to gain a foothold in such municipalities is very high which implies less incentive to compete. This relatively small benefit of competition with the nationally leading ANC also applies at the other end of the spectrum. Municipalities where the ANC win no votes are less likely to face political competition from the ANC. The benefits to the ANC are relatively small because of the lack of support in those areas. The costs of competing where its political influence is relatively weak serves as a dis-incentive to compete in those municipalities. However as you move away from the tails, i.e. the ANC winning all votes or winning no votes, the potential benefits of competition between the ANC and opposition parties becomes larger.
In this paper I use the fraction of voters in a municipality who vote for the ANC in the 1994 national elections as a measure of political competition in that municipality. As an alternative I also use the fraction of voters in the municipality who vote for the ANC during the 1999 election as a measure of the political competition in that municipality. The summary statistics are reported in table one with votes for the ANC ranging from 1% to 98%.
Economic growth in municipalities
Data on economic growth across municipalities is constructed using satellite data on night time lights as in Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2012) The night lights allow economic activity and change in economic activity to be calculated across any geographic area. In this paper I compute the change in night lights for each municipality between 1994 and 2012, and between 1999 and 2012. This starting period corresponds with the two election periods as discussed above and ends with the latest year for which the night time lights data is available.
Results
The argument made in this paper is that municipalities with strong support either for or against the dominant ANC have more freedom to implement economic policy and the opportunity for faster economic growth. In terms of the relationship between growth and political fragmentation, as measured by voter shares in municipalities, I expect higher growth along the tails and slower growth as we move towards municipalities where votes are more To examine this relationship more clearly I estimate a simple quadratic model of the form;
Where G is the change in night lights over a time range, t, ANC is the fraction of voters who voted for the ANC at time t0, C represents controls variables at time, t0, which may influence the growth of municipalities, and is an error term.
The coefficients on ANC and AN C 2 are the major coefficients of interest. There are many other variables which the literature has shown also influence economic growth. I control for these variables to ensure that the relationship between growth and political competition is not spurious. I control for geographical and environmental conditions in the municipality such as the agricultural constraints in the municipality, the fraction of land that can be used for agriculture, the ruggedness and slopes of the terrain in the municipality. I also control for some demographic factors which may influence growth in the long term. The institutions in South Africa during apartheid were designed to segregate populations by race. It is therefore feasible that some of these demographic factors might have affected growth in the municipalities. To account for these I control for the fraction of the municipality that was black African in 1996, the fraction of the municipality that spoke Afrikaans in 1996, the fraction of people in the municipality that were illiterate in 1996, the fraction of the municipality that was unemployed in 1996, and a dummy variable indicating if the municipality was part of the homelands. Finally I control for other variables such as the proximity of roads, railways and waterways, the presence of mining activity, the distance to the coast, and a dummy variable for metropolitan municipalities.
The results controlling for all these variables are reported in table 3 and 4 for both voting patterns in 1994 and voting patterns in 1999 respectively. The concave relationship between voting patterns and growth is present and significant in all cases.
In table 5 I rule out the possibility that the relationship is driven by particular provinces. 
Causality
The results in the previous section suggest a simple quadratic relationship between growth and political fragmentation. However the direction of causality is not established. An alternative explanation to the idea that political competition leads to slower growth is the idea that municipalities with relatively faster growth encourage voters to reward the dominant party. It could also be that political parties in municipalities with faster growth generate more resources to solidify their control of these municipalities, ultimately leading to guaranteed votes and less competition from opposition parties. Regardless, there is reason to believe that the direction of causality between growth and political uncertainty can run both ways. I employ two strategies to deal with the possibility of reverse causality.
First I argue the voting patterns in South Africa were not necessarily driven by economic growth in the preceding periods but by race and tribal concerns. Much has been written about the segregationist policies of the apartheid regime in South Africa before its end in 1994. The segregation led to restrictions on economic potential of different groups based on race. A direct consequence of this was the rise of different political parties that sought to promote the rise of various groups. I argue that the voting patterns are therefore driven not by actual economic growth in these regions but by these demographic and tribal differences across municipalities. Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of the fraction of the population that voted for the ANC against the fraction of the population that is black African in that municipality. The ANC did not win votes in municipalities where a lower fraction of the municipalities was black. On the other hand there was a lot of support for the ANC in many municipalities where a large fraction of the population was black. The relationship between the votes for the ANC and the fraction of the black population is clearer if municipalities in Kwazulu-Natal province are excluded as shown in figure 6 . A strong positive correlation between the fraction of the population that was black and the fraction of votes for the ANC is clear. This suggests that voting behaviour was partly driven by race and not necessarily by economic growth.
The votes by the Zulu speakers also shows that voting behaviour was driven by demographic and tribal factors. The Inthaka Freedom Party, IFP, which had its roots as cultural organization for Zulus, also contested the elections in 1994. Although the party was not exclusively for Zulus it was dominated by Zulus and received backing from Zulu speaking people. Figure 7 shows a scatter plot of the fraction of the population that voted for the ANC and the fraction of the population that listed Zulu as their first language during the 1996 census. Excluding the municipalities with few Zulus, the negative correlation seems apparent. In the context of this paper this promotes the idea that voting patterns were driven by demographic and tribal factors and not necessarily by economic growth.
As a second strategy to estimate the causal relationship between political uncertainty and growth I instrument the voting patterns in the 1999 elections using the voting patterns 
Political Competition and Improvement in Public Services
The previous section shows a u-shaped relationship between political competition and economic growth as proxied by change in night lights. I make the arguments that local municipalities are freer to make decisions without the threat of significant competition and opposition from other parties. Although I show that this affects economic growth directly it should also affect the provision of public services by these governments.
In this section I use data from the census in 1996 and 2011 to examine the effects of political competition on the change the provision of some public services controlling for 13 general growth and other factors. The censuses in both years report the fraction of the municipality that lives in formal dwellings, the fraction with access to piped water and the fraction with access to electricity. Using votes for the ANC in 1994 as an instrument for votes in 1999, I estimate the relationship between political competition and change in the supply of these public services. I control for growth as proxied by change in night lights, to
show that this improvement in public services was not necessarily a direct results of economic growth. Table 8 reports the results with column 1 representing the effect on change in the fraction of the municipality living in formal dwellings. Column 2 represents the effect on the change in fraction of the municipality with access to electricity and column 3 represents the effect on the change in the fraction of the population with access to piped water. The results in all cases show a significant u-shaped relationship between political competition and an improvement in the provision of public services. This suggests that even after controlling for growth, municipalities with less political competition are more effective in the provision of public services.
Effects of Political Competition; Insights from

Individual-Level Surveys
The results in the previous section show that municipalities with lower political competition have grown faster since 1996. These municipalities have also had greater improvement in the provision of public services. In this section I use results from surveys to get a better picture of individual voter attitudes and the relationship with political competition.
I use data from the 4th round of the afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2008. The survey is designed to generate a sample that is a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age. The survey asks citizens a number of questions concerning various issues including governance. I use some of these questions to gage the attitudes of voters across different municipalities. For each question used I control for the age of the respondent, a dummy variable if the respondent is the head of the household, the gender of the respondent, the race of the respondent, the level of education of the respondent, the religion of the respondent, a dummy variable if the respondent owns a radio, a television or a motor vehicle, and the employment status of the respondent. The results are reported in table 9.
Respondents in municipalities with higher political competition are more likely to predict a negative future outlook for the economy. In response to the question, "Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time?", they are more like to respond negatively. They are also more likely to state that the country is moving in the wrong direction and that economic policies of the government hurt most and benefit only a few.
In response to questions of democracy in South Africa, respondents in municipalities with greater political competition are less like to consider South Africa a democracy and are less satisfied with the political system. For example in response to the question, "In your opinion how much of a democracy is South Africa today?", respondents are more likely respond that South Africa is not a democracy.
Finally in response to the question, "In your opinion, how often, in this country: Does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict?", respondents in municipalities with higher competition are more likely to state that it leads to violent conflict.
The theme from the individual voters is a dissatisfaction with government and less optimistic view of the future. They are also more likely to see political competition as a source of problems in government. The results are consistent with results in the previous sections. It is expected that municipalities with slower growth and weaker performance in the provision of public services, will have voters that are more dissatisfied with the status quo.
Conclusions
In this paper I show that areas with lower political competition show faster growth. I instrument voting patterns in the 1999 elections using voting patterns in the 1994 elections controlling for growth in between to show that this relationship is at least partly causal. I
show that this relationship also manifests in the provision of public services in municipalities over the period. The results suggest that the political competition serves as a disadvantage to the growth of both private enterprise and the expansion of public services by creating the opportunity for opposition parties to block actions or hinder the policy making process. This result add to the literature on the effect of political systems on economic growth. Specifically it shows that variation in growth across political systems is not necessarily caused by the type of system but by the internal dynamics of the particular political system. 
